An economic analysis of two player contest with productive effort and sabotage
Rank-order tournament payment schemes are widely adopted by firms and organizations as incentive mechanisms to motivate employees to work hard. However, these schemes also give rise to incentives for sabotage among workers, which will reduce output and thus harm profit-maximizing employers. Liu and...
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Main Author: | Chen, Shao |
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Other Authors: | School of Humanities and Social Sciences |
Format: | Final Year Project |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/59633 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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