论中国国有企业经营者的选任，激励和监督机制 = Managers of state-owned enterprises in China : selection, incentive and supervision mechanism
The reform of state-owned enterprises plays a center role in China's economic system reform. One of the key problems of state-owned enterprises in China is how to select, supervise and provide right incentives to their managers. The purpose of this paper is to find out a systematic method to so...
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| Format: | Theses and Dissertations |
| Language: | Chinese |
| Published: |
2008
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/7237 |
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| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | Chinese |
| Summary: | The reform of state-owned enterprises plays a center role in China's economic system reform. One of the key problems of state-owned enterprises in China is how to select, supervise and provide right incentives to their managers. The purpose of this paper is to find out a systematic method to solve the problem mentioned above. To do so, the paper analyses the managers' behavior of state-owned enterprises, based on the principal-agent theory and the survey of 60 managers of 20 enterprises in QingHuangDao City, P. R. China. |
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