Coworker relations and incentive schemes

In the workforce, when seen from an economic theory perspective, managers’ main aim is to maximise the firms’ profits. However, they have no idea whether workers act in their best interests. Therefore, managers need to think about how to utilise different incentive schemes to elicit effort and truth...

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Main Authors: Teo, Erica Yan Ting, Soh, Geraldine Zixin, Teo, Hui Xin
Other Authors: Tan Teck Yong
Format: Final Year Project
Language:English
Published: 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10356/77024
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-770242019-12-10T14:26:16Z Coworker relations and incentive schemes Teo, Erica Yan Ting Soh, Geraldine Zixin Teo, Hui Xin Tan Teck Yong School of Social Sciences DRNTU::Social sciences::Economic theory In the workforce, when seen from an economic theory perspective, managers’ main aim is to maximise the firms’ profits. However, they have no idea whether workers act in their best interests. Therefore, managers need to think about how to utilise different incentive schemes to elicit effort and truthful reporting of workers’ performance with minimal cost. We discover that coworker relations not only have implications on the productivity in workplaces, it is also an important attribute for the cost and effectiveness of incentive schemes. This paper develops a principal-two-agent model where output is affected by the agents’ joint effort level as well as the quality of their relationship. Our model takes into consideration two different relationship parameters: r1 which affects output and r2 which affects the worker’s utility. The results show that manager’s profit increases with r1 and decreases with r2. We also discover that with a more intensive coworker relations, peer evaluation bonus can incentivise effort. In line with this, the optimal contract always includes a peer evaluation bonus. However, peer evaluation may become costly and less accurate with increasing intensity of coworker relations. Hence, at times, the optimal contract may be a combination of peer evaluation and output bonus. Bachelor of Arts in Economics 2019-04-30T14:34:00Z 2019-04-30T14:34:00Z 2019 Final Year Project (FYP) http://hdl.handle.net/10356/77024 en 35 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Social sciences::Economic theory
spellingShingle DRNTU::Social sciences::Economic theory
Teo, Erica Yan Ting
Soh, Geraldine Zixin
Teo, Hui Xin
Coworker relations and incentive schemes
description In the workforce, when seen from an economic theory perspective, managers’ main aim is to maximise the firms’ profits. However, they have no idea whether workers act in their best interests. Therefore, managers need to think about how to utilise different incentive schemes to elicit effort and truthful reporting of workers’ performance with minimal cost. We discover that coworker relations not only have implications on the productivity in workplaces, it is also an important attribute for the cost and effectiveness of incentive schemes. This paper develops a principal-two-agent model where output is affected by the agents’ joint effort level as well as the quality of their relationship. Our model takes into consideration two different relationship parameters: r1 which affects output and r2 which affects the worker’s utility. The results show that manager’s profit increases with r1 and decreases with r2. We also discover that with a more intensive coworker relations, peer evaluation bonus can incentivise effort. In line with this, the optimal contract always includes a peer evaluation bonus. However, peer evaluation may become costly and less accurate with increasing intensity of coworker relations. Hence, at times, the optimal contract may be a combination of peer evaluation and output bonus.
author2 Tan Teck Yong
author_facet Tan Teck Yong
Teo, Erica Yan Ting
Soh, Geraldine Zixin
Teo, Hui Xin
format Final Year Project
author Teo, Erica Yan Ting
Soh, Geraldine Zixin
Teo, Hui Xin
author_sort Teo, Erica Yan Ting
title Coworker relations and incentive schemes
title_short Coworker relations and incentive schemes
title_full Coworker relations and incentive schemes
title_fullStr Coworker relations and incentive schemes
title_full_unstemmed Coworker relations and incentive schemes
title_sort coworker relations and incentive schemes
publishDate 2019
url http://hdl.handle.net/10356/77024
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