Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system

False data injection (FDI) attacks are crucial security threats to smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS), and could result in cataclysmic consequences to the entire power system. However, due to the high dependence on open information networking, countering FDI attacks is challenging in smart grid...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Li, Beibei, Lu, Rongxing, Wang, Wei, Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond
Other Authors: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/80762
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/42218
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
Description
Summary:False data injection (FDI) attacks are crucial security threats to smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS), and could result in cataclysmic consequences to the entire power system. However, due to the high dependence on open information networking, countering FDI attacks is challenging in smart grid CPS. Most existing solutions are based on state estimation (SE) at the highly centralized control center; thus, computationally expensive. In addition, these solutions generally do not provide a high level of security assurance, as evidenced by recent work that smart FDI attackers with knowledge of system configurations can easily circumvent conventional SE-based false data detection mechanisms. In this paper, in order to address these challenges, a novel distributed host-based collaborative detection method is proposed. Specifically, in our approach, we use a conjunctive rule based majority voting algorithm to collaboratively detect false measurement data inserted by compromised phasor measurement units (PMUs). In addition, an innovative reputation system with an adaptive reputation updating algorithm is also designed to evaluate the overall running status of PMUs, by which FDI attacks can be distinctly observed. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted with real-time measurement data obtained from the PowerWorld simulator, and the numerical results fully demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposal.