Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system

False data injection (FDI) attacks are crucial security threats to smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS), and could result in cataclysmic consequences to the entire power system. However, due to the high dependence on open information networking, countering FDI attacks is challenging in smart grid...

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Main Authors: Li, Beibei, Lu, Rongxing, Wang, Wei, Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond
Other Authors: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2017
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/80762
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/42218
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-807622020-03-07T13:57:23Z Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system Li, Beibei Lu, Rongxing Wang, Wei Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS) False data injection attack False data injection (FDI) attacks are crucial security threats to smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS), and could result in cataclysmic consequences to the entire power system. However, due to the high dependence on open information networking, countering FDI attacks is challenging in smart grid CPS. Most existing solutions are based on state estimation (SE) at the highly centralized control center; thus, computationally expensive. In addition, these solutions generally do not provide a high level of security assurance, as evidenced by recent work that smart FDI attackers with knowledge of system configurations can easily circumvent conventional SE-based false data detection mechanisms. In this paper, in order to address these challenges, a novel distributed host-based collaborative detection method is proposed. Specifically, in our approach, we use a conjunctive rule based majority voting algorithm to collaboratively detect false measurement data inserted by compromised phasor measurement units (PMUs). In addition, an innovative reputation system with an adaptive reputation updating algorithm is also designed to evaluate the overall running status of PMUs, by which FDI attacks can be distinctly observed. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted with real-time measurement data obtained from the PowerWorld simulator, and the numerical results fully demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposal. Accepted version 2017-03-31T05:23:55Z 2019-12-06T13:58:23Z 2017-03-31T05:23:55Z 2019-12-06T13:58:23Z 2016 Journal Article Li, B., Lu, R., Wang, W., & Choo, K.-K. R. (2017). Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system. Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, 103, 32-41. 0743-7315 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/80762 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/42218 10.1016/j.jpdc.2016.12.012 en Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing 32 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS)
False data injection attack
spellingShingle Smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS)
False data injection attack
Li, Beibei
Lu, Rongxing
Wang, Wei
Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond
Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system
description False data injection (FDI) attacks are crucial security threats to smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS), and could result in cataclysmic consequences to the entire power system. However, due to the high dependence on open information networking, countering FDI attacks is challenging in smart grid CPS. Most existing solutions are based on state estimation (SE) at the highly centralized control center; thus, computationally expensive. In addition, these solutions generally do not provide a high level of security assurance, as evidenced by recent work that smart FDI attackers with knowledge of system configurations can easily circumvent conventional SE-based false data detection mechanisms. In this paper, in order to address these challenges, a novel distributed host-based collaborative detection method is proposed. Specifically, in our approach, we use a conjunctive rule based majority voting algorithm to collaboratively detect false measurement data inserted by compromised phasor measurement units (PMUs). In addition, an innovative reputation system with an adaptive reputation updating algorithm is also designed to evaluate the overall running status of PMUs, by which FDI attacks can be distinctly observed. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted with real-time measurement data obtained from the PowerWorld simulator, and the numerical results fully demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposal.
author2 School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
author_facet School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Li, Beibei
Lu, Rongxing
Wang, Wei
Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond
format Article
author Li, Beibei
Lu, Rongxing
Wang, Wei
Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond
author_sort Li, Beibei
title Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system
title_short Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system
title_full Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system
title_fullStr Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system
title_full_unstemmed Distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system
title_sort distributed host-based collaborative detection for false data injection attacks in smart grid cyber-physical system
publishDate 2017
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/80762
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/42218
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