Think Twice Before Going for Incentives: Social Norms and the Principal's Decision on Compensation Contracts
Principals make decisions on various issues, ranging from contract design to control system implementation. Few studies examine the principal's active role in these decisions. We experimentally investigate this role by studying how a principal's choice of an incentive contract that may dis...
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Main Authors: | Cardinaels, Eddy, Yin, Huaxiang |
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Other Authors: | Nanyang Business School |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2016
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/81901 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/39741 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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