Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA

Internet of Things connects lots of small constrained devices to the Internet. As in any other environment, communication security is important and cryptographic algorithms are one of many elements that we use in order to keep messages secure. It is necessary to use algorithms that do not require hi...

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Main Authors:	Breier, Jakub, He, Wei
Other Authors:	2015 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT)
Format:	Conference or Workshop Item
Language:	English
Published:	2016
Subjects:	Fault Attack PRESENT
Online Access:	https://hdl.handle.net/10356/83813 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41452
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Institution:	Nanyang Technological University
Language:	English

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spelling	sg-ntu-dr.10356-838132020-09-26T22:15:06Z Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA Breier, Jakub He, Wei 2015 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT) Temasek Laboratories Fault Attack PRESENT Internet of Things connects lots of small constrained devices to the Internet. As in any other environment, communication security is important and cryptographic algorithms are one of many elements that we use in order to keep messages secure. It is necessary to use algorithms that do not require high computational power, lightweight ciphers are therefore an ideal candidate for this purpose. Since these devices work in various environments, it is necessary to test security of implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we explore a possibility of attacking an ultralightweight cipher PRESENT by using a multiple fault attack. Utilizing the Differential Fault Analysis technique, we were able to recover the secret key with two faulty encryptions and an exhaustive search of 216 remaining key bits. Our attack aims at four nibbles in the penultimate round of the cipher, causing faulty output in all nibbles of the output. We also provide a practical attack scenario by exploiting Hardware Trojan (HT) technique for the proposed fault injection in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA. Accepted version 2016-09-16T05:26:26Z 2019-12-06T15:32:35Z 2016-09-16T05:26:26Z 2019-12-06T15:32:35Z 2015 Conference Paper Breier, J., & He, W. (2015). Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA. 2015 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT), 15802065-. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/83813 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41452 10.1109/SIOT.2015.15 en © 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SIOT.2015.15]. 7 p. application/pdf
institution	Nanyang Technological University
building	NTU Library
country	Singapore
collection	DR-NTU
language	English
topic	Fault Attack PRESENT
spellingShingle	Fault Attack PRESENT Breier, Jakub He, Wei Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA
description	Internet of Things connects lots of small constrained devices to the Internet. As in any other environment, communication security is important and cryptographic algorithms are one of many elements that we use in order to keep messages secure. It is necessary to use algorithms that do not require high computational power, lightweight ciphers are therefore an ideal candidate for this purpose. Since these devices work in various environments, it is necessary to test security of implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we explore a possibility of attacking an ultralightweight cipher PRESENT by using a multiple fault attack. Utilizing the Differential Fault Analysis technique, we were able to recover the secret key with two faulty encryptions and an exhaustive search of 216 remaining key bits. Our attack aims at four nibbles in the penultimate round of the cipher, causing faulty output in all nibbles of the output. We also provide a practical attack scenario by exploiting Hardware Trojan (HT) technique for the proposed fault injection in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA.
author2	2015 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT)
author_facet	2015 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT) Breier, Jakub He, Wei
format	Conference or Workshop Item
author	Breier, Jakub He, Wei
author_sort	Breier, Jakub
title	Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA
title_short	Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA
title_full	Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA
title_fullStr	Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA
title_full_unstemmed	Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA
title_sort	multiple fault attack on present with a hardware trojan implementation in fpga
publishDate	2016
url	https://hdl.handle.net/10356/83813 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41452
_version_	1681056372619214848

Multiple Fault Attack on PRESENT with a Hardware Trojan Implementation in FPGA

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