Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Kang, Jun-Koo, Luo, Juan, Na, Hyun Seung
• مؤلفون آخرون: Nanyang Business School
• التنسيق: مقال
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2019
• الموضوعات: Institutional Investors; DRNTU::Business::Finance; Corporate Governance
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86194; http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48303
• المؤسسة: Nanyang Technological University

We examine whether institutions’ monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal return...