Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?
We examine whether institutions’ monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal return...
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Main Authors: | Kang, Jun-Koo, Luo, Juan, Na, Hyun Seung |
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Other Authors: | Nanyang Business School |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2019
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86194 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48303 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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