The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision
Can we trust the operational intuitions of generals? The proponents of the overconfidence model, one of the most influential perspectives in the psychology of judgment, commonly offer a skeptical answer. Generals’ operational intuitions are likely to be hampered by overconfidence and negatively affe...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-893432020-11-01T08:05:52Z The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision Vennesson, Pascal Huan, Amanda S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Inchon Landing Korean War DRNTU::Social sciences::Military and naval science Can we trust the operational intuitions of generals? The proponents of the overconfidence model, one of the most influential perspectives in the psychology of judgment, commonly offer a skeptical answer. Generals’ operational intuitions are likely to be hampered by overconfidence and negatively affect military effectiveness. However, the successful operational outcome of General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon (June–September 1950) seemingly contradicts the model. We seek to complement and refine the overconfidence model by examining the Inchon landing decision through the analytical lens of the recognition-primed decision model. This model typically envisions that under specific circumstances—notably an experienced decision maker, an adequate environment regularity, and an opportunity to learn—generals are able to make quick and satisfactory decisions. We show that such a configuration was present in the Inchon landing case and helps explain both the decision process and its successful outcome. Accepted version 2019-05-24T04:45:50Z 2019-12-06T17:23:22Z 2019-05-24T04:45:50Z 2019-12-06T17:23:22Z 2018 Journal Article Vennesson, P., & Huan, A. (2018). The General’s Intuition. Armed Forces & Society, 44(3), 498-520. doi:10.1177/0095327X17738771 0095-327X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/89343 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48355 10.1177/0095327X17738771 en Armed Forces & Society © 2017 The Author(s). All rights reserved. This paper was published by SAGE Publications in Armed Forces & Society and is made available with permission of The Author(s). 35 p. application/pdf |
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Inchon Landing Korean War DRNTU::Social sciences::Military and naval science Vennesson, Pascal Huan, Amanda The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision |
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Can we trust the operational intuitions of generals? The proponents of the overconfidence model, one of the most influential perspectives in the psychology of judgment, commonly offer a skeptical answer. Generals’ operational intuitions are likely to be hampered by overconfidence and negatively affect military effectiveness. However, the successful operational outcome of General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon (June–September 1950) seemingly contradicts the model. We seek to complement and refine the overconfidence model by examining the Inchon landing decision through the analytical lens of the recognition-primed decision model. This model typically envisions that under specific circumstances—notably an experienced decision maker, an adequate environment regularity, and an opportunity to learn—generals are able to make quick and satisfactory decisions. We show that such a configuration was present in the Inchon landing case and helps explain both the decision process and its successful outcome. |
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S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies |
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S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Vennesson, Pascal Huan, Amanda |
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Article |
author |
Vennesson, Pascal Huan, Amanda |
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Vennesson, Pascal |
title |
The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision |
title_short |
The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision |
title_full |
The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision |
title_fullStr |
The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision |
title_full_unstemmed |
The general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision |
title_sort |
general’s intuition : overconfidence, pattern matching, and the inchon landing decision |
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2019 |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10356/89343 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48355 |
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1683494269230252032 |