Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman
Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-901212020-07-03T01:50:35Z Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman Forcehimes, Andrew T. Semrau, Luke School of Humanities DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics Consequentialism Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism. 2019-05-29T03:10:32Z 2019-12-06T17:41:04Z 2019-05-29T03:10:32Z 2019-12-06T17:41:04Z 2018 Journal Article Forcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2019). Actualism doesn’t have control issues: a reply to Cohen and Timmerman. Philosophia, 47(1), 271-277. doi:10.1007/s11406-018-9957-x 0048-3893 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90121 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48437 10.1007/s11406-018-9957-x en Philosophia © 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature. All rights reserved. |
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DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics Consequentialism |
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DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics Consequentialism Forcehimes, Andrew T. Semrau, Luke Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman |
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Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism. |
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School of Humanities |
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School of Humanities Forcehimes, Andrew T. Semrau, Luke |
| format |
Article |
| author |
Forcehimes, Andrew T. Semrau, Luke |
| author_sort |
Forcehimes, Andrew T. |
| title |
Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman |
| title_short |
Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman |
| title_full |
Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman |
| title_fullStr |
Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman |
| title_sort |
actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to cohen and timmerman |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90121 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48437 |
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1681058939770241024 |