The cost of stability in coalitional games

• Main Authors: Bachrach, Yoram, Elkind, Edith, Meir, Reshef, Zuckerman, Michael, Rothe, Jӧrg, Pasechnik, Dmitrii V., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
• Other Authors: School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
• Format: Conference or Workshop Item
• Language: English
• Published: 2012
• Subjects: DRNTU::Science::Mathematics
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94109; http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7628
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In t...