Scale-Invariant Behavior in a Spatial Game of Prisoners’ Dilemma

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: LIM, Yun Fong, Chen, Kan, Jayaprakash, Ciriyam
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2002
• الموضوعات: Business; Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods; Operations and Supply Chain Management
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/878; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/1877/viewcontent/yflim_PRE2002.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

A spatially extended version of the game of prisoner’s dilemma, originally proposed by Nowak and May, is modified to include stochastic updating and found to exhibit scale-invariant behavior. Two critical regimes with different scaling behaviors are found; the corresponding exponents have been determined numerically. Spatially, the critical states are characterized by the existence of delicately balanced networks of defectors separating domains of cooperators; temporally, the evolution of the critical states following local perturbations is characterized by avalanches of various magnitudes, which cause restructuring of the networks of defectors on all scales.