Scale-Invariant Behavior in a Spatial Game of Prisoners’ Dilemma
A spatially extended version of the game of prisoner’s dilemma, originally proposed by Nowak and May, is modified to include stochastic updating and found to exhibit scale-invariant behavior. Two critical regimes with different scaling behaviors are found; the corresponding exponents have been deter...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2002
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/878 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/1877/viewcontent/yflim_PRE2002.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | A spatially extended version of the game of prisoner’s dilemma, originally proposed by Nowak and May, is modified to include stochastic updating and found to exhibit scale-invariant behavior. Two critical regimes with different scaling behaviors are found; the corresponding exponents have been determined numerically. Spatially, the critical states are characterized by the existence of delicately balanced networks of defectors separating domains of cooperators; temporally, the evolution of the critical states following local perturbations is characterized by avalanches of various magnitudes, which cause restructuring of the networks of defectors on all scales. |
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