The Newsvendor's Optimal Incentive Contracts for Multiple Advertisers

We consider a newsvendor who earns a revenue from the sales of her product to end users as well as from multiple advertisers paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions of a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertisers have private information about...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Wu, Zhengping, CRAMA, Pascale, Zhu, Wanshan
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3787
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/4786/viewcontent/WuCrama2012EJORNewvendorMultiple_AFV.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English