The Newsvendor's Optimal Incentive Contracts for Multiple Advertisers

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Wu, Zhengping, CRAMA, Pascale, Zhu, Wanshan
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
• الموضوعات: newsvendor model; inventory; pricing; mechanism design; revenue management; Operations and Supply Chain Management
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3787; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/4786/viewcontent/WuCrama2012EJORNewvendorMultiple_AFV.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

We consider a newsvendor who earns a revenue from the sales of her product to end users as well as from multiple advertisers paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions of a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertisers have private information about...