Anchors weigh more than power: Why absolute powerlessness liberates negotiators to achieve better outcomes

• Main Authors: SCHAERER, Michael, SWAAB, Roderick I., GALINSKY, Adam D.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
• Subjects: negotiation; power; alternatives; first offer; anchoring; negotiator focus; Organizational Behavior and Theory; Strategic Management Policy
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5153; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6152/viewcontent/Schaerer__Swaab____Galinsky_PS2015_anchors_weigh_more_than_power.pdf; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6152/filename/0/type/additional/viewcontent/DS_10.11770956797614558718.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

The current research shows that having no power can be better than having a little power. Negotiators prefer having some power (weak negotiation alternatives) to having no power (no alternatives). We challenge this belief that having any alternative is beneficial by demonstrating that weak alternati...