The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts
Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-es...
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sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-61702019-07-08T03:39:00Z The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts LOSCHELDER, David D. FRIESE, Malte SCHAERER, Michael GALINSKY, Adam D. Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant implications for everyday life. 2016-10-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5171 info:doi/10.1177/0956797616666074 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6170/viewcontent/Too_much_precision_effect_2016_PS_av.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University anchoring judgment negotiation first offers precision experts versus amateurs open data open materials Organizational Behavior and Theory Organization Development |
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anchoring judgment negotiation first offers precision experts versus amateurs open data open materials Organizational Behavior and Theory Organization Development LOSCHELDER, David D. FRIESE, Malte SCHAERER, Michael GALINSKY, Adam D. The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts |
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Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant implications for everyday life. |
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text |
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LOSCHELDER, David D. FRIESE, Malte SCHAERER, Michael GALINSKY, Adam D. |
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LOSCHELDER, David D. FRIESE, Malte SCHAERER, Michael GALINSKY, Adam D. |
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LOSCHELDER, David D. |
title |
The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts |
title_short |
The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts |
title_full |
The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts |
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The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts |
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The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts |
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too-much precision effect: when and why precise anchors backfire with experts |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2016 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5171 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6170/viewcontent/Too_much_precision_effect_2016_PS_av.pdf |
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