Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives

Negotiators have a natural preference for more over fewer alternatives. After all, alternatives seem to provide the necessary leverage to achieve superior negotiation outcomes (Study 1). The present research shows that although negotiating with multiple alternatives makes negotiators feel more power...

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Main Author: SCHAERER, Michael
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5783
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spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-67822018-05-10T08:18:13Z Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives SCHAERER, Michael Negotiators have a natural preference for more over fewer alternatives. After all, alternatives seem to provide the necessary leverage to achieve superior negotiation outcomes (Study 1). The present research shows that although negotiating with multiple alternatives makes negotiators feel more powerful than negotiating with only one alternative, the exposure to multiple anchors can weigh down the size of their first offer and lead to worse outcomes. Building on recent research suggesting that the influence of anchors on subsequent judgments is best understood as a scaling effect, we propose a bargaining zone distortion theory of negotiations to explain the counterintuitive nature of multiple alternatives: the exposure to multiple alternative, as opposed to one alternative, distorts the subjective bargaining zone and makes a particular first offer appear more extreme, leading to a downward-adjustment of the first offer size. In our studies, we found that multiple alternatives lead to lower first offers than one alternative and that this relationship was mediated by negotiators’ biased perceptions of the subjective bargaining zone (Studies 2-4). This effect even held when the additional alternative was slightly better than the single one (Study 3), but disappeared when the alternatives did not span a range (Study 4), or when negotiators received linguistic cues about the extremity of their offers (Study 5). Importantly, multiple alternatives not only lead to lower first offers but also worse negotiation outcomes, and this effect was contingent on who makes the first offer (Study 6). We discuss implications for the negotiation, power, and anchoring literature. 2015-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5783 info:doi/10.5465/AMBPP.2015.14466abstract Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Organizational Behavior and Theory
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Organizational Behavior and Theory
spellingShingle Organizational Behavior and Theory
SCHAERER, Michael
Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives
description Negotiators have a natural preference for more over fewer alternatives. After all, alternatives seem to provide the necessary leverage to achieve superior negotiation outcomes (Study 1). The present research shows that although negotiating with multiple alternatives makes negotiators feel more powerful than negotiating with only one alternative, the exposure to multiple anchors can weigh down the size of their first offer and lead to worse outcomes. Building on recent research suggesting that the influence of anchors on subsequent judgments is best understood as a scaling effect, we propose a bargaining zone distortion theory of negotiations to explain the counterintuitive nature of multiple alternatives: the exposure to multiple alternative, as opposed to one alternative, distorts the subjective bargaining zone and makes a particular first offer appear more extreme, leading to a downward-adjustment of the first offer size. In our studies, we found that multiple alternatives lead to lower first offers than one alternative and that this relationship was mediated by negotiators’ biased perceptions of the subjective bargaining zone (Studies 2-4). This effect even held when the additional alternative was slightly better than the single one (Study 3), but disappeared when the alternatives did not span a range (Study 4), or when negotiators received linguistic cues about the extremity of their offers (Study 5). Importantly, multiple alternatives not only lead to lower first offers but also worse negotiation outcomes, and this effect was contingent on who makes the first offer (Study 6). We discuss implications for the negotiation, power, and anchoring literature.
format text
author SCHAERER, Michael
author_facet SCHAERER, Michael
author_sort SCHAERER, Michael
title Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives
title_short Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives
title_full Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives
title_fullStr Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives
title_full_unstemmed Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives
title_sort bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: the elusive power of multiple alternatives
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2015
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5783
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