From market making to matchmaking: Does bank regulation harm market liquidity?
Post-crisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7099 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8098/viewcontent/SaarSunYangZhu_matchmaking_sv.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Post-crisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market structure by intensifying competitive pressure from non-bank dealers and incentivizing bank dealers to shift their business toward matchmaking. Thus, post-crisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation. |
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