Learning from manipulable signals

• Main Authors: EKMEKCI, Mehmet, GORNO, Leandrro, MAESTRI, Lucas, SUN, Jian, WEI, Dong
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
• Subjects: Asymmetric information; learning; signal manipulation; venture capital; Finance; Finance and Financial Management
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7105; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8104/viewcontent/2007.08762.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The agent is privately informed about his type. The principal learns about the agent’s type from a noisy performance measure, which can be manipulated by the agent via a costly and hidden action. We fully characterize the unique Mark...