Learning from manipulable signals
We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The agent is privately informed about his type. The principal learns about the agent’s type from a noisy performance measure, which can be manipulated by the agent via a costly and hidden action. We fully characterize the unique Mark...
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Main Authors: | EKMEKCI, Mehmet, GORNO, Leandrro, MAESTRI, Lucas, SUN, Jian, WEI, Dong |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7105 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8104/viewcontent/2007.08762.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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