Vulnerability analysis of EMAP: An efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol

In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of EMAP, an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. (2006). We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against the protocol. The former permanently di...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LI, Tieyan, DENG, Robert H.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2007
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/529
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1528/viewcontent/EMAP_2007_pv.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
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Summary:In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of EMAP, an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. (2006). We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against the protocol. The former permanently disables the authentication capability of a RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader. The latter completely compromises a tag by extracting all the secret information stored in the tag. The de-synchronization attack can be carried out in just round of interaction in EMAP while the full-disclosure attack is accomplished across several runs of EMAP. We also discuss ways to counter the attacks