Vulnerability analysis of EMAP: An efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol
In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of EMAP, an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. (2006). We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against the protocol. The former permanently di...
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Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2007
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/529 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1528/viewcontent/EMAP_2007_pv.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Summary: | In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of EMAP, an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. (2006). We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against the protocol. The former permanently disables the authentication capability of a RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader. The latter completely compromises a tag by extracting all the secret information stored in the tag. The de-synchronization attack can be carried out in just round of interaction in EMAP while the full-disclosure attack is accomplished across several runs of EMAP. We also discuss ways to counter the attacks |
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