Vulnerability analysis of EMAP: An efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol

• Main Authors: LI, Tieyan, DENG, Robert H.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2007
• Subjects: vulnerability analysis; EMAP protocol; efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol; security vulnerabilities; desynchronization attack; full-disclosure attack; Information Security
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/529; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1528/viewcontent/EMAP_2007_pv.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of EMAP, an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. (2006). We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against the protocol. The former permanently disables the authentication capability of a RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader. The latter completely compromises a tag by extracting all the secret information stored in the tag. The de-synchronization attack can be carried out in just round of interaction in EMAP while the full-disclosure attack is accomplished across several runs of EMAP. We also discuss ways to counter the attacks