Hybrid Mechanism for Heterogeneous E-Procurement Involving a Combinatorial Auction and Bargaining

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: HUANG, He, Kauffman, Robert J., XU, Hongyan, ZHAO, Lan
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
• الموضوعات: Bargaining; Combinatorial auctions; E-procurement; Mechanism design; Myopic best responses; Negotiation; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism; Computer Sciences; E-Commerce
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1756; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2013.03.006
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

We discuss the design of a hybrid mechanism for e-procurement, which implements a multi-attribute combinatorial auction, followed by a bargaining process to achieve desirable procurement transaction outcomes. For the auction phase of the mechanism, we discuss incentive-compatible bidding strategies...