Hybrid Mechanism for Heterogeneous E-Procurement Involving a Combinatorial Auction and Bargaining

Hybrid Mechanism for Heterogeneous E-Procurement Involving a Combinatorial Auction and Bargaining

We discuss the design of a hybrid mechanism for e-procurement, which implements a multi-attribute combinatorial auction, followed by a bargaining process to achieve desirable procurement transaction outcomes. For the auction phase of the mechanism, we discuss incentive-compatible bidding strategies...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: HUANG, He, Kauffman, Robert J., XU, Hongyan, ZHAO, Lan
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
Bargaining
Combinatorial auctions
E-procurement
Mechanism design
Myopic best responses
Negotiation
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
Computer Sciences
E-Commerce
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1756
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2013.03.006
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1756
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2013.03.006

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