Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity

On a "marketplace" platform, where two sides of users trade, the platform owner has an incentive to regulate its marketplace for a higher profit. This study focuses on a monopoly platform's nonpricing, regulatory strategies in governing quality heterogeneity of competing sellers. In c...

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Main Authors: WU, Ruhai, Lin, Mei
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1961
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2960/viewcontent/LinM2013PlatformRegulationSeller.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-29602014-02-24T02:18:56Z Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity WU, Ruhai Lin, Mei On a "marketplace" platform, where two sides of users trade, the platform owner has an incentive to regulate its marketplace for a higher profit. This study focuses on a monopoly platform's nonpricing, regulatory strategies in governing quality heterogeneity of competing sellers. In contrast to related studies, we endogenize strategic interactions among platform users. Our model extends the circular city model to capture seller heterogeneity in both variety and quality. The closed-form equilibrium solution reveals a ripple effect that exerts competitive pressure from seller to seller at a diminishing magnitude. The equilibrium analysis enables us to connect the economic mechanisms in users' trading strategies with the platform's regulatory problem. We find that the platform does not benefit from an equal support to all sellers that increases the average quality. Instead, the platform owner is better off providing discriminatory support in favor of higher-quality sellers to enhance quality heterogeneity. Moreover, the optimal quality support rate is lower for a higher average of seller quality because quality support is more costly; on the other hand, a higher variance make quality levels more responsive to discriminatory support and leads to a higher support rate. A higher transportation cost for buyers diminishes the optimal support rate because quality support is less effective when sellers are more differentiated. Lastly, we also consider non-competitive equilibria of the circular city model to discuss the feasibility of the competitive case. 2013-07-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1961 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2960/viewcontent/LinM2013PlatformRegulationSeller.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Platform regulation variety quality heterogeneity circular-city model Computer Sciences Management Information Systems
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Platform regulation
variety
quality heterogeneity
circular-city model
Computer Sciences
Management Information Systems
spellingShingle Platform regulation
variety
quality heterogeneity
circular-city model
Computer Sciences
Management Information Systems
WU, Ruhai
Lin, Mei
Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity
description On a "marketplace" platform, where two sides of users trade, the platform owner has an incentive to regulate its marketplace for a higher profit. This study focuses on a monopoly platform's nonpricing, regulatory strategies in governing quality heterogeneity of competing sellers. In contrast to related studies, we endogenize strategic interactions among platform users. Our model extends the circular city model to capture seller heterogeneity in both variety and quality. The closed-form equilibrium solution reveals a ripple effect that exerts competitive pressure from seller to seller at a diminishing magnitude. The equilibrium analysis enables us to connect the economic mechanisms in users' trading strategies with the platform's regulatory problem. We find that the platform does not benefit from an equal support to all sellers that increases the average quality. Instead, the platform owner is better off providing discriminatory support in favor of higher-quality sellers to enhance quality heterogeneity. Moreover, the optimal quality support rate is lower for a higher average of seller quality because quality support is more costly; on the other hand, a higher variance make quality levels more responsive to discriminatory support and leads to a higher support rate. A higher transportation cost for buyers diminishes the optimal support rate because quality support is less effective when sellers are more differentiated. Lastly, we also consider non-competitive equilibria of the circular city model to discuss the feasibility of the competitive case.
format text
author WU, Ruhai
Lin, Mei
author_facet WU, Ruhai
Lin, Mei
author_sort WU, Ruhai
title Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity
title_short Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity
title_full Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity
title_fullStr Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity
title_full_unstemmed Platform Regulation on Seller Heterogeneity
title_sort platform regulation on seller heterogeneity
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2013
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1961
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2960/viewcontent/LinM2013PlatformRegulationSeller.pdf
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