Mechanism Design for E- Procurement Auctions: On the Efficacy of Post-Auction Negotiation and Quality Effort Incentives

• Main Authors: HUANG, He, Kauffman, Robert J., XU, Hongyan, ZHAO, Lan
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
• Subjects: Auctions; Bonuses; Buyers; Economic modeling; Incentives; Information asymmetries; Mechanism design; Negotiation; Procurement; Supply quality; Supplier selection; Unobservable quality; Computer Sciences; E-Commerce
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2119; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2010.12.002
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Practical mechanisms for procurement involve bidding, negotiation, transfer payments and subsidies, and the possibility of verification of unobservable product and service quality. We model two proposed multi-stage procurement mechanisms. One focuses on the auction price that is established, and the...