Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement

While e-procurement auction has helped firms to achieve lower procurement costs, auction mechanisms that prevail at present in procurement markets need to address an important issue that concerns the ability to maintain long term relationships with the partners, especially in repeated e-procurement...

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Main Authors: Park J., Lee J., Lau H.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3338
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/4340/viewcontent/RelationshipPreservingAuction.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-43402016-12-27T05:51:55Z Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement Park J., Lee J., Lau H., While e-procurement auction has helped firms to achieve lower procurement costs, auction mechanisms that prevail at present in procurement markets need to address an important issue that concerns the ability to maintain long term relationships with the partners, especially in repeated e-procurement settings. In this paper, we propose a Relationship Preserving Auction (RPA) mechanism that augments the conventional auction mechanism with a bidder relationship scoring model. Our proposed mechanism gives increased chances of winning to the bidders who have bidden at relatively competitive price but had comparatively less wins so far. Keeping these bidders in the auction over time will lead to more competitive bidding prices and eventually reduce the auctioneer's total procurement cost in repeated auctions. From simulation experiments, we show how RPA works under different bidders' behavior. We show that RPA is able to obtain lower procurement cost compared to conventional procurement auctions when bidders bid opportunistically and renege readily to other markets. 2008-08-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3338 info:doi/10.1145/1409540.1409587 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/4340/viewcontent/RelationshipPreservingAuction.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Auction E-procurement Supplier relationship Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Computer Sciences E-Commerce
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Auction
E-procurement
Supplier relationship
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Computer Sciences
E-Commerce
spellingShingle Auction
E-procurement
Supplier relationship
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Computer Sciences
E-Commerce
Park J.,
Lee J.,
Lau H.,
Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
description While e-procurement auction has helped firms to achieve lower procurement costs, auction mechanisms that prevail at present in procurement markets need to address an important issue that concerns the ability to maintain long term relationships with the partners, especially in repeated e-procurement settings. In this paper, we propose a Relationship Preserving Auction (RPA) mechanism that augments the conventional auction mechanism with a bidder relationship scoring model. Our proposed mechanism gives increased chances of winning to the bidders who have bidden at relatively competitive price but had comparatively less wins so far. Keeping these bidders in the auction over time will lead to more competitive bidding prices and eventually reduce the auctioneer's total procurement cost in repeated auctions. From simulation experiments, we show how RPA works under different bidders' behavior. We show that RPA is able to obtain lower procurement cost compared to conventional procurement auctions when bidders bid opportunistically and renege readily to other markets.
format text
author Park J.,
Lee J.,
Lau H.,
author_facet Park J.,
Lee J.,
Lau H.,
author_sort Park J.,
title Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
title_short Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
title_full Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
title_fullStr Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
title_full_unstemmed Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
title_sort relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2008
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3338
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/4340/viewcontent/RelationshipPreservingAuction.pdf
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