Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing

Off-the-shelf smartphones have boosted large scale participatory sensing applications as they are equipped with various functional sensors, possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and proliferate at a breathtaking pace. Yet the low participation level of smartphone users due to...

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Main Authors: ZHANG, Xinglin, YANG, Zheng, ZHOU, Zimu, CAI, Haibin, CHEN, Lei, LI, Xiang-Yang
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4506
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5509/viewcontent/TPDS2297112.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-55092019-12-19T06:01:02Z Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing ZHANG, Xinglin YANG, Zheng ZHOU, Zimu CAI, Haibin CHEN, Lei LI, Xiang-Yang Off-the-shelf smartphones have boosted large scale participatory sensing applications as they are equipped with various functional sensors, possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and proliferate at a breathtaking pace. Yet the low participation level of smartphone users due to various resource consumptions, such as time and power, remains a hurdle that prevents the enjoyment brought by sensing applications. Recently, some researchers have done pioneer works in motivating users to contribute their resources by designing incentive mechanisms, which are able to provide certain rewards for participation. However, none of these works considered smartphone users’ nature of opportunistically occurring in the area of interest. Specifically, for a general smartphone sensing application, the platform would distribute tasks to each user on her arrival and has to make an immediate decision according to the user’s reply. To accommodate this general setting, we design three online incentive mechanisms, named TBA, TOIM and TOIMAD, based on online reverse auction. TBA is designed to pursue platform utility maximization, while TOIM and TOIM-AD achieve the crucial property of truthfulness. All mechanisms possess the desired properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, and profitability. Besides, they are highly competitive compared to the optimal offline solution. The extensive simulation results reveal the impact of the key parameters and show good approximation to the state-of-the-art offline mechanism 2014-01-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4506 info:doi/10.1109/TPDS.2013.2297112 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5509/viewcontent/TPDS2297112.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Crowdsourcing incentive mechanism mobile sensing Software Engineering
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Crowdsourcing
incentive mechanism
mobile sensing
Software Engineering
spellingShingle Crowdsourcing
incentive mechanism
mobile sensing
Software Engineering
ZHANG, Xinglin
YANG, Zheng
ZHOU, Zimu
CAI, Haibin
CHEN, Lei
LI, Xiang-Yang
Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing
description Off-the-shelf smartphones have boosted large scale participatory sensing applications as they are equipped with various functional sensors, possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and proliferate at a breathtaking pace. Yet the low participation level of smartphone users due to various resource consumptions, such as time and power, remains a hurdle that prevents the enjoyment brought by sensing applications. Recently, some researchers have done pioneer works in motivating users to contribute their resources by designing incentive mechanisms, which are able to provide certain rewards for participation. However, none of these works considered smartphone users’ nature of opportunistically occurring in the area of interest. Specifically, for a general smartphone sensing application, the platform would distribute tasks to each user on her arrival and has to make an immediate decision according to the user’s reply. To accommodate this general setting, we design three online incentive mechanisms, named TBA, TOIM and TOIMAD, based on online reverse auction. TBA is designed to pursue platform utility maximization, while TOIM and TOIM-AD achieve the crucial property of truthfulness. All mechanisms possess the desired properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, and profitability. Besides, they are highly competitive compared to the optimal offline solution. The extensive simulation results reveal the impact of the key parameters and show good approximation to the state-of-the-art offline mechanism
format text
author ZHANG, Xinglin
YANG, Zheng
ZHOU, Zimu
CAI, Haibin
CHEN, Lei
LI, Xiang-Yang
author_facet ZHANG, Xinglin
YANG, Zheng
ZHOU, Zimu
CAI, Haibin
CHEN, Lei
LI, Xiang-Yang
author_sort ZHANG, Xinglin
title Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing
title_short Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing
title_full Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing
title_fullStr Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing
title_full_unstemmed Free market of crowdsourcing: Incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing
title_sort free market of crowdsourcing: incentive mechanism design for mobile sensing
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2014
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4506
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5509/viewcontent/TPDS2297112.pdf
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