Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: LUO, Tie, KANHERE, Salil S., DAS, Sajal K., Hwee-Pink TAN
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
• الموضوعات: Crowdsourcing; mobile crowd sensing; participatory sensing; all-pay auction; asymmetric auction; strategy autonomy; Computer Sciences; Software Engineering
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2877; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3877/viewcontent/IncentiveMechanismDesignAllPayContests_2016.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers' types (e.g., abilities, costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios usi...