Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests
Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers' types (e.g., abilities, costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios usi...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | , , , |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2877 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3877/viewcontent/IncentiveMechanismDesignAllPayContests_2016.pdf |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
id |
sg-smu-ink.sis_research-3877 |
---|---|
record_format |
dspace |
spelling |
sg-smu-ink.sis_research-38772017-04-04T06:41:05Z Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests LUO, Tie KANHERE, Salil S. DAS, Sajal K. Hwee-Pink TAN, Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers' types (e.g., abilities, costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios using an asymmetric all-pay contest (or auction) model. Our design objective is an optimal mechanism, i.e., one that maximizes the crowdsourcing revenue minus cost. To achieve this, we furnish the contest with a prize tuple which is an array of reward functions for each potential winner (worker). We prove and characterize the unique equilibrium of this contest, and also solve the optimal prize tuple. In addition, this study discovers a counter-intuitive property, strategy autonomy (SA), which means that heterogeneous workers behave independently of one another as if they were in a homogeneous setting. In game-theoretical terms, it says that an asymmetric auction admits a symmetric equilibrium. Not only theoretically interseting, but SA also has important practical implications on mechanism complexity, energy efficiency, crowdsourcing revenue, and system scalability. By scrutinizing seven mechanisms, our extensive performance evaluation demonstrates the superior performance of our mechanism as well as offers insights into the SA property. 2016-09-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2877 info:doi/10.1109/TMC.2015.2485978 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3877/viewcontent/IncentiveMechanismDesignAllPayContests_2016.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Crowdsourcing mobile crowd sensing participatory sensing all-pay auction asymmetric auction strategy autonomy Computer Sciences Software Engineering |
institution |
Singapore Management University |
building |
SMU Libraries |
continent |
Asia |
country |
Singapore Singapore |
content_provider |
SMU Libraries |
collection |
InK@SMU |
language |
English |
topic |
Crowdsourcing mobile crowd sensing participatory sensing all-pay auction asymmetric auction strategy autonomy Computer Sciences Software Engineering |
spellingShingle |
Crowdsourcing mobile crowd sensing participatory sensing all-pay auction asymmetric auction strategy autonomy Computer Sciences Software Engineering LUO, Tie KANHERE, Salil S. DAS, Sajal K. Hwee-Pink TAN, Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests |
description |
Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers' types (e.g., abilities, costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios using an asymmetric all-pay contest (or auction) model. Our design objective is an optimal mechanism, i.e., one that maximizes the crowdsourcing revenue minus cost. To achieve this, we furnish the contest with a prize tuple which is an array of reward functions for each potential winner (worker). We prove and characterize the unique equilibrium of this contest, and also solve the optimal prize tuple. In addition, this study discovers a counter-intuitive property, strategy autonomy (SA), which means that heterogeneous workers behave independently of one another as if they were in a homogeneous setting. In game-theoretical terms, it says that an asymmetric auction admits a symmetric equilibrium. Not only theoretically interseting, but SA also has important practical implications on mechanism complexity, energy efficiency, crowdsourcing revenue, and system scalability. By scrutinizing seven mechanisms, our extensive performance evaluation demonstrates the superior performance of our mechanism as well as offers insights into the SA property. |
format |
text |
author |
LUO, Tie KANHERE, Salil S. DAS, Sajal K. Hwee-Pink TAN, |
author_facet |
LUO, Tie KANHERE, Salil S. DAS, Sajal K. Hwee-Pink TAN, |
author_sort |
LUO, Tie |
title |
Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests |
title_short |
Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests |
title_full |
Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests |
title_fullStr |
Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests |
title_full_unstemmed |
Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests |
title_sort |
incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests |
publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2877 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3877/viewcontent/IncentiveMechanismDesignAllPayContests_2016.pdf |
_version_ |
1770572661575909376 |