Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-pay Auction Approach

• Main Authors: LUO, Tie, DAS, Sajal K., Hwee-Pink TAN, XIA, Lirong
• 格式: text
• 語言: English
• 出版: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
• 主題: Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Mobile crowd sensing; shading effect; participatory sensing; incomplete information; risk aversion; Computer Sciences; Software Engineering
• 在線閱讀: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2878; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3878/viewcontent/ACMTIST2015.pdf
• 機構: Singapore Management University

Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal (crowdsourcer) desires to solicit maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) while agents are only motivated to act to their own respective advantages. To reconcile this tension, we propose an all-pay au...