Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-pay Auction Approach

Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-pay Auction Approach

Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal (crowdsourcer) desires to solicit maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) while agents are only motivated to act to their own respective advantages. To reconcile this tension, we propose an all-pay au...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LUO, Tie, DAS, Sajal K., Hwee-Pink TAN, XIA, Lirong
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
Subjects:
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Mobile crowd sensing
shading effect
participatory sensing
incomplete information
risk aversion
Computer Sciences
Software Engineering
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2878
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3878/viewcontent/ACMTIST2015.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2878
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3878/viewcontent/ACMTIST2015.pdf

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