Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-pay Auction Approach
Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal (crowdsourcer) desires to solicit maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) while agents are only motivated to act to their own respective advantages. To reconcile this tension, we propose an all-pay au...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2878 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3878/viewcontent/ACMTIST2015.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |