Profit-Maximizing Incentive for Participatory Sensing

Profit-Maximizing Incentive for Participatory Sensing

We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users (agents) while at the same time lowering his payout, which we formulate as a profit-maximization problem. We use a co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LUO, Tie, TAN, Hwee-Pink, XIA, Lirong
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
Subjects:
Bayesian game
Mechanism design
all-pay auction
crowd-sensing
network economics
perturbation analysis
Software Engineering
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2937
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3937/viewcontent/infocom2014.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2937
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3937/viewcontent/infocom2014.pdf

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