Profit-Maximizing Incentive for Participatory Sensing
We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users (agents) while at the same time lowering his payout, which we formulate as a profit-maximization problem. We use a co...
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Main Authors: | LUO, Tie, TAN, Hwee-Pink, XIA, Lirong |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2014
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2937 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3937/viewcontent/infocom2014.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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