Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests
Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers' types (e.g., abilities, costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios usi...
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Main Authors: | LUO, Tie, KANHERE, Salil S., DAS, Sajal K., Hwee-Pink TAN |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2877 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3877/viewcontent/IncentiveMechanismDesignAllPayContests_2016.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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