Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions

Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the actions of bidders less visible during the auc...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: BAJARI, Patrick, YEO, Jungwon
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
Subjects:
FCC spectrum auctions
Simultaneous ascending auctions
Collusion
Auction design
Behavioral Economics
Economics
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/190
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1189/viewcontent/spectrum.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/190
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1189/viewcontent/spectrum.pdf

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