Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the actions of bidders less visible during the auc...
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Main Authors: | BAJARI, Patrick, YEO, Jungwon |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2009
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/190 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1189/viewcontent/spectrum.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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