Should We Collude? Analyzing the Benefits of Bidder Cooperation in Group-Buying Auctions

Should We Collude? Analyzing the Benefits of Bidder Cooperation in Group-Buying Auctions

Cooperation among bidders in traditional auctions is typically forbidden. This is because it is viewed as being harmful to the interests of sellers, who hope to obtain fair prices for their sale items. It also may be harmful to other bidders who are not able to take advantage of any cooperation that...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHEN, J., CHEN, X., Kauffman, Robert J., SONG, X.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
Subjects:
Analytical modeling
Bidder cooperation
Bidding rings
Collusion
Economic analysis
Electronic markets
Group-buying auctions
Market mechanisms
Mechanism design
Online auctions
Computer Sciences
E-Commerce
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2124
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2008.11.010
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2124
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2008.11.010

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