Should We Collude? Analyzing the Benefits of Bidder Cooperation in Group-Buying Auctions

• Main Authors: CHEN, J., CHEN, X., Kauffman, Robert J., SONG, X.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
• Subjects: Analytical modeling; Bidder cooperation; Bidding rings; Collusion; Economic analysis; Electronic markets; Group-buying auctions; Market mechanisms; Mechanism design; Online auctions; Computer Sciences; E-Commerce
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2124; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2008.11.010
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Cooperation among bidders in traditional auctions is typically forbidden. This is because it is viewed as being harmful to the interests of sellers, who hope to obtain fair prices for their sale items. It also may be harmful to other bidders who are not able to take advantage of any cooperation that...