Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests

• Main Authors: LUO, Tie, KANHERE, Salil S., DAS, Sajal K., Hwee-Pink TAN
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
• Subjects: Crowdsourcing; mobile crowd sensing; participatory sensing; all-pay auction; asymmetric auction; strategy autonomy; Computer Sciences; Software Engineering
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2877; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3877/viewcontent/IncentiveMechanismDesignAllPayContests_2016.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers' types (e.g., abilities, costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios usi...