Bounding regret in empirical games
Empirical game-theoretic analysis refers to a set of models and techniques for solving large-scale games. However, there is a lack of a quantitative guarantee about the quality of output approximate Nash equilibria (NE). A natural quantitative guarantee for such an approximate NE is the regret in th...
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Main Authors: | JECMEN, Steven, SINHA, Arunesh, LI, Zun, TRAN-THANH, Long |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2020
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5075 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6078/viewcontent/AAAI_20_Bandit_Submission.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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