Bounding regret in empirical games
Empirical game-theoretic analysis refers to a set of models and techniques for solving large-scale games. However, there is a lack of a quantitative guarantee about the quality of output approximate Nash equilibria (NE). A natural quantitative guarantee for such an approximate NE is the regret in th...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2020
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5075 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6078/viewcontent/AAAI_20_Bandit_Submission.pdf |
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