Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Incentives

• المؤلف الرئيسي: KWON, Young Koan
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2005
• الموضوعات: accounting conservatism; moral hazard; limited liability; agency costs; Accounting; Corporate Finance
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/150; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/1149/viewcontent/KwonYK2005mnscAccountingConservation_pub.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

There are two sources of agency costs under moral hazard: (1) distortions in incentive contracts and (2) implementation of suboptimal decisions. In the accounting literature, the relation between conservative accounting and agency costs of type (1) has received considerable attention (cf. Watts 2002...