Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Incentives
There are two sources of agency costs under moral hazard: (1) distortions in incentive contracts and (2) implementation of suboptimal decisions. In the accounting literature, the relation between conservative accounting and agency costs of type (1) has received considerable attention (cf. Watts 2002...
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Main Author: | KWON, Young Koan |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2005
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/150 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/1149/viewcontent/KwonYK2005mnscAccountingConservation_pub.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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