Disclosure when the Market is Unsure of Information Endowment of Managers
The article focuses on information disclosure by management in uncertain markets. It mentions that when management doesn't disclose information, investors are left to wonder if the lack of information disclosure is due to the lack of knowledge by managers or due to the adverse content of the in...
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Main Author: | KWON, Young Koan |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
1988
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/696 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2491117 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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