Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models
In a principal-agent relationship, the principal tries to develop a sharing rule that both motivates the agent and shares risk. In examining the use of randomized strategies in the structuring of optimal contracts in agency settings, ex post randomization (over fee schedules following act selection...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
1984
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/730 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555682 |
| الوسوم: |
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| المؤسسة: | Singapore Management University |
| اللغة: | English |
| الملخص: | In a principal-agent relationship, the principal tries to develop a sharing rule that both motivates the agent and shares risk. In examining the use of randomized strategies in the structuring of optimal contracts in agency settings, ex post randomization (over fee schedules following act selection by the agent) is distinguished from ex ante randomization (over fee schedules before act selection). It is shown that ex ante randomization may be efficient in both full information and private information settings where certain assumptions are made regarding preferences and the production of technology. Although additive separability and concavity of the agent's utility function, as well as concavity of the production, rule out ex post randomization, they do not preclude efficient ex ante randomized contracts in private information settings. |
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