Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models
In a principal-agent relationship, the principal tries to develop a sharing rule that both motivates the agent and shares risk. In examining the use of randomized strategies in the structuring of optimal contracts in agency settings, ex post randomization (over fee schedules following act selection...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | KWON, Young Koan, Fellingham, J., Newman, P. |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
1984
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/730 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555682 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Agency Theory with Multiplicative Preferences
by: KWON, Young Koan, et al.
Published: (1982) -
Accrual versus Cash-Basis Accounting Methods: An Agency-Theoretic Comparison
by: KWON, Young Koan
Published: (1989) -
Stochastic dominance and information value
by: KWON, Young Koan, et al.
Published: (1979) -
Costly Public Information: Optimality and Comparative Statics
by: KWON, Young Koan, et al.
Published: (1988) -
Derivation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model without Normality or Quadratic Preference: A Note
by: KWON, Young Koan
Published: (1985)