Monitoring: Which institutions matter?
Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated ho...
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Main Authors: | CHEN, Xia, Harford, Jarrad, LI, Kai |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2007
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/820 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/1819/viewcontent/SSRN_id930185.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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