Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision

Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision

Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the mar...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHENG, Qiang, LUO, Ting, YUE, Heng
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
management forecast
managerial incentives
insider trading
forecast precision
Accounting
Corporate Finance
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1079
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2078/viewcontent/Managerial_Incentives_2013_sv.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1079
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2078/viewcontent/Managerial_Incentives_2013_sv.pdf

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