Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision
Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the mar...
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Main Authors: | CHENG, Qiang, LUO, Ting, YUE, Heng |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1079 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2078/viewcontent/Managerial_Incentives_2013_sv.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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